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ABSTRACT 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong had an exuberant year in 2006 
when it listed sixty-two companies.  The listing of the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China Limited on its Main Board earned the 
exchange the enviable status of being home to the world’s largest 
initial public offering.  The HK$333.2 billion in initial public 
offering capital raised during the year propelled it to the position of 
second among global exchanges, behind London but ahead of New 
York. 
This Article examines an increasingly common feature of initial 
public offerings in Hong Kong, namely, the introduction of 
“cornerstone investors” whose participation enhances the general 
receptiveness to a stock offering.  This approach does have a 
significant downside, however.  The new category of “cornerstone 
investor” may not be completely consistent with the principles of 
equity of the Listing Rules in Hong Kong. 
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Article has benefited from the critique of Dr. S.K. Fung and Professor Kevin Lam.  The 
author acknowledges with gratitude the financial support of the CLP Group, Ernst & 
Young, Noble Group Limited and Tricor Services Limited without which this project 
would not have been possible.  All opinions expressed herein and all omissions 
therefrom are the sole and exclusive responsibility of the author. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The year 2006 was considered the “Year of Records” for the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong (the “SEHK”).1  On December 28, 2006, the 
last trading day of that year, the aggregate market capitalization of the 
1,173 listed companies totaled a record HK$13,339.9 billion2 (approxi-
mately US$1.71 trillion).3  The Hang Seng Index, the benchmark of the 
SEHK, closed at a record 20001.91 points.4  Trading was extremely 
robust throughout the year.  Numerous records were set with total mar-
ket turnover (approximately HK$8.38 trillion), average daily turnover 
(approximately HK$33.9 billion), and single-month turnover (approxi-
 1. See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., MARKET STATISTICS 2006,  
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0701122news.xls [hereinafter MARKET 
STATISTICS 2006] (statistics and analysis in this Article cover a period of establishment 
of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong starting from April 1986 through December 31, 
2006). 
 2. See id.  There were 975 companies listed on the Main Board and another 198 
on the Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”) as of December 31, 2006.  Sometimes com-
mentators in Hong Kong refer to the GEM as the “Second Board” due to its objective of 
providing an alternative listing mechanism for companies that do not meet the stricter 
quantitative and/or qualitative requirements for a listing on the Main Board governed by 
Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Ltd. 
See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., RULES GOVERNING THE LISTING OF 
SECURITIES ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG LIMITED, http://www.hkex.com. 
hk/rule/listrules/listrules.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) [hereinafter LISTING RULES].  
A further set of rules, namely the Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the 
Growth Enterprise Market of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, Ltd. (the “GEM 
RULES”), apply to issuers seeking a listing on the Growth Enterprise Market.  See 
GROWTH ENTERPRISE MARKET, http://www.hkgem.com/root/e_default.asp (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2009); see also C. K. Low, A Brave New World: The Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Holds Court, 21 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 8, 464 (2006) (arguing that these 
rules are contractual by nature). 
 3. The Hong Kong dollar (HK$) trades at a range of HK$7.75 to HK$7.85 per 
U.S. dollar (US$).  This paper uses an exchange rate of US$1 to HK$7.80 as this was 
the best rate rounded up to two decimal points as quoted on Jan. 15, 2007.  See 
Exchange Rates Table for American Dollar, http://www.x-rates.com/d/USD/table.html 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2009); cf. Currency Board System, http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/ 
eng/currency/link_ex/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 
 4. See HANG SENG INDEXES CO. LTD., http://www.hsi.com.hk (last visited Jan. 29, 
2009) (providing an overview of the constituents and computation of the different 
indices).  The benchmark Hang Seng Index is comprised of 39 companies as of Dec. 4, 
2006.  See FAFs and Weightings of HSI Constituents, http://main.hsi.com.hk/hsicom/ 
new/faf_weightings_e.xls (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
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mately HK$1.08 trillion).5  Records were also set with equity capital 
raised during initial public offerings (“IPOs”) at HK$333.2 billion6 and 
total equity capital at HK$505.9 billion.7  In addition, the SEHK became 
home to the largest IPO in the world with its successful listing of the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China on October 27, 2006.8  The 
SEHK listed 2,823 new derivative warrants during 2006, contributing 
roughly HK$1.79 trillion (US$229.5 billion) in trading turnover.9 
A significant contributor to Hong Kong’s explosive market dynam-
ics in 2006 was the enthusiasm for the listings of H-shares10, which are 
foreign shares issued with a nominal value in Renminbi by Mainland 
Chinese companies that are listed on the SEHK and traded in Hong 
Kong Dollars.11  The increasing importance of such companies to the 
continued prominence of SEHK as one of the world’s leading stock ex-
changes12 is highlighted by the fact that the top ten IPOs on the SEHK in 
 5. See MARKET STATISTICS 2006, supra note 1.  The corresponding amounts in 
U.S. currency are about US$1.05 trillion, US$4.35 billion and US$138.46 billion, 
respectively.  For convenience, all of these amounts have been rounded up to the second 
decimal point. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id.  The amount raised from IPOs during 2006 was approximately 
US$42.72 billion, while the total equity capital raised was about US$64.86 billion. 
 8. See Chris Oliver, ICBC offering raises $19 billion; world’s biggest IPO, 
MARKETWATCH, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx? 
guid=%7B1C3D03AC-5988-4646-B8CB-571483B78682%7D&siteid=mktw. 
 9. See MARKET STATISTICS 2006, supra note 1. The previous records were set in 
2005 when the 1,682 newly listed derivative warrants contributed towards HK$856.6 
billion or about US$109.82 billion in trading turnover. Id. 
 10. See generally LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at ch. 19A, available at 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_19A.pdf (defining H shares as “overseas 
listed foreign shares which are listed on the Exchange”). 
 11. The Renminbi, or “RMB,” is the currency of the People’s Republic of China, 
which had, until July 21, 2005, been officially pegged to the U.S. Dollar at the rate of 
US$1 equal to RMB8.28.  See, e.g., Richard McGregor, China ends renminbi’s decade-
old peg to dollar, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2005, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ 
f56082a0-f9d9-11d9-b092-00000e2511c8.html.  The RMB has since appreciated steadi-
ly and consistently to the exchange rate of US$1 to RMB7.80, which is at parity to the 
Hong Kong dollar.  This paper will be using this rate as this was the best rate rounded 
up to two decimal points.  See XE – Universal Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/ 
ucc/convert.cgi (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).  Although RMB denominated accounts may 
be maintained at selected banks in Hong Kong the currency is not freely convertible.  
See Wikipedia, Renmibi, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renminbi (last visited Feb. 5, 
2009). 
 12. With a 63.1 percent increase in aggregate market capitalization of its listed 
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2006 involved the sale of H-shares, each of which raised more than 
HK$20 billion (US$2.56 billion), individually.13  The trading of H-
shares also accounted for eight of the top ten largest listed companies in 
terms of turnover in 2006.14  Their combined annual turnover of 
HK$1.81 trillion (US$232 billion) represented approximately 21.6 
percent of the total market turnover achieved by all companies listed on 
the SEHK in 2006, the significance of which is amplified by the fact that 
two of these eight companies were only listed since June 1 of that year.15 
Even amidst growing concerns over the state of the IPO market in 
the United States,16 a rising sense of energy in Hong Kong brought to 
the foreground a number of related issues, including the high rates of 
over-subscription and the extent of under pricing.17  This Article 
examines yet another dimension of IPOs that gained prominence in 
Hong Kong throughout 2006, namely, the increasing incidence of the 
introduction of “cornerstone investors”18, whose participation in an IPO 
is viewed positively, particularly amongst retail investors.19  While 
companies during 2006, the SEHK (referred to as Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing) 
ranks sixth globally behind the New York Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
Nasdaq Stock Market, London Stock Exchange, and Euronext. See FOCUS, WORLD 
FED’N OF EXCH., Jan. 2007, available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/ 
Focus107.pdf. 
 13. See MARKET STATISTICS 2006, supra note 1, at 14. 
 14. See Id. at 15. 
 15. H-Shares of the Bank of China, Ltd. and the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China were listed on June 1, 2006 and Oct. 27, 2006, respectively.  HKExnews New 
Listing Report 2006, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/reports/newlisting/2006. 
XLS. 
 16. See, e.g., Henry Blodget, How U.S. IPOs Lost Their Pop, NEWSWEEK INT’L, 
May 15, 2006, at 44. 
 17. See C. K. Low, The Duties of Directors in ‘Irrationally Exuberant’ Initial 
Public Offerings, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 89, 99, 108 (2007). 
 18. See Prospectus of Bank of China, Ltd 114-19, available at http://www.hkex 
news.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060518/3988/F115_e.pdf (providing typical des-
criptions of cornerstone investors); Kate Linebaugh, Hong Kong Elite Score on IPOs – 
Tycoons Received Star Treatment; Big Allotments Are Now Criticized But Once Helped 
Deals Get Done, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2006, at C1 [hereinafter Linebaugh, Star 
Treatment]; Kate Linebaugh, Chinese IPO Gets Star Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 
2006, at C4 [hereinafter Linebaugh, Star Investors]. 
 19. A typical IPO in Hong Kong comprises two tranches namely “International 
Placing Shares” and “Hong Kong Offer Shares” which are commonly referred to as the 
“International Offer Shares” and “Public Offer Shares” respectively.  The former is 
reserved for institutional investors, while Hong Kong Offer Shares is the “retail 
tranche” of the IPO that is available for direct subscription by the general public.  The 
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acknowledging that such investors may contribute to the success of the 
IPO, this Article points out that the creation of this new category of 
investor violates the spirit of the regulatory framew
II.  A PRIMER ON LISTING IN HONG KONG20 
The SEHK is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Exchanges 
and Clearing Limited, the latter of which is itself a for-profit public 
company that was listed by way of introduction on the SEHK in July 
2000.21  The principal function of the SEHK is to provide a fair, efficient 
and orderly market for the trading of securities; it is empowered to pre-
scribe such requirements for companies seeking or maintaining a listing 
as are necessary to attain these objectives.22  These requirements are set 
out in separate but broadly similar Listing Rules for the Main Board and 
the Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”) of the SEHK.23 
The GEM is essentially designed to provide emerging enterprises – 
companies that have good business ideas and growth potential, but 
which do not meet the profitability or track record requirements of the 
Main Board of the SEHK – with access to the capital markets.24  Its 
launch coincided with the technology boom of the late 1990s, during 
which there was an apparent need for such a market to facilitate the list-
ing of low profitability/high growth potential companies in Hong Kong 
and Mainland China.  Investing on the GEM thus involves greater risk, 
premised on the principle of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware”, which is 
evidenced by its greater volatility vis-à-vis the Main Board. 
Despite its relative success in raising approximately HK$45 billion 
(US$5.8 billion) for the 220 companies that listed between the year of its 
inception and 2005, the GEM has nonetheless suffered a steady decline 
term “retail investor” refers to members of the public who submit direct applications for 
the Hong Kong Share Offer portion of IPOs.  See Low, supra note 17, at n.10. 
 20. See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., LISTING IN HONG KONG: A 
QUALITY MARKET (2008), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/issuer/listhk/Aug08_ 
LIHK_E.pdf (providing an overview of the listing process and continuing obligations 
thereafter). 
 21. See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., LISTING DOCUMENT (June 27, 
2000), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/relation/lstdoc/lstdoc.htm. 
 22. See Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, 2003, Cap. 571, §§21-24 
(H.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm. 
 23. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2. 
 24. Id. at chs. 11, 24-25 (describing the goal and purpose of the GEM). 
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in recent years.25  The majority of GEM listed securities presently trade 
below their IPO price; the companies experienced losses or prolonged 
periods of suspensions which contributed to the general market illi-
quidity.26  This prompted the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 
Limited to consult the market on the possible restructuring of GEM in 
January 2006 to determine the approach that best suits the present needs 
of the various stakeholders.27  The scope of this Article will thus focus 
exclusively on IPOs on the Main Board of the SEHK. 
Although an IPO is the most common mode of seeking a listing on 
the SEHK, it is not the only method.  A “placing” or an “introduction” 
may be considered under appropriate circumstances.28  A “placing” is 
the obtaining of subscriptions for, or the sale of shares by, a company or 
intermediary primarily from or to selected persons, the criteria for which 
is set out in Appendix 6 of the Listing Rules titled Placing Guidelines 
for Equity Securities.29  An “introduction” is the ideal method for the 
listing of companies whose shares are so widely held that adequate 
marketability can be assumed.30  An introduction is particularly appro-
priate for companies seeking a secondary listing in Hong Kong.31  In 
every case, the company must satisfy both the quantitative and quali-
tative criteria that are set out in Chapter 8 of the Listing Rules.32 
The SEHK mandates that at least 25 percent of the company’s 
shares be held by investors who are independent of the directors and 
substantial shareholders of the company in order to ensure an adequate 
 25. See HONG KONG EXCHS. AND CLEARING, LTD., Discussion Paper on the Growth 
Enterprise Market 3 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/consul/paper/ 
gemdp_e.PDF. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id at 1. 
 28. The IPO could proceed by way of either an offer for subscription by the com-
pany that involves the new issue of shares or an offer for sale by its existing share-
holders.  Proceeds from the former will go to the company while the vendor share-
holders will be the main beneficiaries of the offer for sale.  See LISTING RULES, supra 
note 2, at ch. 7. 
 29. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at vol. 2 app. 6. 
 30. Id. at R. 7.13. 
 31. Id. at R. 7.14(1). 
 32. Id. at ch. 8.  These criteria should be read in conjunction with the “General 
Principles” that are set out in Rules 2.03 to 2.06 which emphasize matters such as the 
maintenance of a fair and orderly market, ensuring fair and equal treatment of investors 
and keeping them fully informed, and having directors meet their fiduciary obligations.  
See id. at ch. 2. 
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open market for the freely transferable shares for which listing is 
sought.33  This threshold may be reduced to as low as 15 percent at the 
discretion of the SEHK for companies whose market capitalization will 
exceed HK$10 billion (US$1.28 billion) on the date of their listing.34 
Apart from the regulatory framework, any decision to list a com-
pany will be driven by an assessment of whether the proposed terms of 
the IPO are acceptable to both the company and its targeted investors.  
This consideration has gravitated toward an objective and easily ascer-
tainable benchmark: the pricing of the IPO.  The SEHK adopts a system 
that combines both book building and public offers to provide com-
panies and their underwriters with more flexibility in securing sufficient 
interest for an IPO.35 
Book building is an important price discovery mechanism because 
it allows for the advance gathering of indications of interest from across 
a wide spectrum of potential investors.36  Central to the book building 
process is the ability of the underwriter to control the allocation of 
shares, so long as the shares are sold at the same price.  This process 
involves the company and its underwriter setting an initial price range 
and inviting bids for its shares during the “road show” to promote its 
forthcoming IPO.  Investors respond by indicating both the number of 
shares sought as well as the price that they are willing to pay.  Thus, 
with proper coordination, book building can effectively enable the 
company and its underwriter to reduce the risks associated with the IPO 
by securing guarantees from investors to buy a sufficient number of the 
shares.37 
To ensure the broadest possible spread of shareholding for the 
“Public Offer” portion of the IPO and to enhance the fair treatment of 
investors, the SEHK has mandated the establishment of a “two pool” 
system for the allocation of shares in all IPOs.38  Under this system, the 
 33. Id. at R. 8.08. 
 34. Id. at 8.08(1)(d). 
 35. See Ann E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building versus 
Auctions with Endogenous Entry, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 615 (2005) (reviewing the 
differences between various modes for IPOs and giving a review of finance literature on 
the subject). 
 36. Id. at 616. 
 37. Id. at 615. 
 38. See THE STOCK EXCH. OF HONG KONG, LTD., PRACTICE NOTE 18 TO THE RULES 
GOVERNING THE LISTING OF SECURITIES (June 26, 1998), available at http://www. 
hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/PN18.doc [hereinafter PRACTICE NOTE 18].  Practice Note 18 
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total number of shares that are available for public subscription under 
the IPO is divided equally into two pools, “Pool A” and “Pool B”.39  The 
former must be allocated on an equitable basis to those subscribing for 
shares with a value of $5 million or less, while the latter applies on the 
same basis for those whose applications exceed a value of $5 million.40  
Where one of the pools is under-subscribed, the surplus shares must be 
transferred from the under-subscribed pool to the other and allocated 
accordingly.41  This system is further refined in the following manner 
when the IPO involves a placing tranche:42 
 
• The subscription tranche should be no less than 10 percent 
of the shares offered in the IPO; 
• This will increase to 30 percent via a clawback mechanism 
should the subscription tranche be oversubscribed by 
between 15 and 50 times; 
• The threshold will be further increased to 40 percent where 
the rate of oversubscription is between 50 and 100 times; 
and 
• At least 50 percent of the shares must be available for allo-
cation under the subscription tranche if the oversub-
scription rate exceeds 100 times.  In such an event, both 
the placing and the subscription tranches would comprise 
the same number of shares.43 
 
applies to the retail portion of the IPO, which is available for direct subscription by the 
general public. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 2.  This placing tranche is also generally known as the “International 
Placing Shares” or “International Offer Shares”, which is set aside for the book building 
process during which the company and its advisers will organize road shows for insti-
tutional investors.  Under normal circumstances, this placing tranche will constitute 90 
percent of the total number of shares offered during the IPO, although companies may 
apply for a waiver of strict compliance with Practice Note 18 to increase this proportion 
to a maximum of 95 percent. 
 43. Id.  Investors may choose to apply for shares in either the placing tranche or the 
subscription tranche, or for both tranches should these be completed simultaneously. 
However, to ensure fairness in the event of the latter, shares may only be allocated to 
the investor from either the placing or the subscription tranche but not from both. 
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The foregoing “clawback” provisions do not apply to over-allot-
ment or “green shoe” options that are granted to the underwriter, who 
retains sole discretion on how they are to be allocated.44 
III.  A REVIEW OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN 2006 
The fifty-three IPOs during 2006 raised a collective total of approx-
imately HK$332.1 billion (US$42.6 billion) in new equity capital.45  
However, not all of funds raised are received by the company, as the 
IPO may comprise a combination of an offer for subscription as well as 
an offer for sale. While the company receives money from an offer for 
subscription, it is the existing shareholders who benefit from an offer for 
sale, since this involves the disposal of a portion of their shareholding.46 
Although the average size of the fifty-three IPOs during 2006 was 
approximately HK$6.3 billion (US$803 million), the range was signify-
cantly larger, between HK$11 million (US$1.4 million) raised by 
Winbox International (Holdings) Limited47 and about HK$125 billion 
(US$16 billion) by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
Limited, the largest IPO in the world.48  The successful listing of the 
 44. See, e.g., Investopedia, Greenshoe Option, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
g/greenshoe.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).  It is customary for companies to grant 
greater than 15 percent of the number of offer shares to its underwriters under such a 
“green shoe” or over-allotment option which may be exercised at the discretion of the 
underwriter within 30 days of the close of the IPO; Franze SA & Schlag C, Over-
allotment Options in IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Market – An Empirical Investigation 
(CFS Working Paper No. 2002/16), available at http://www.soc.uoc.gr/econ/static_ 
content/seminars/Schlag.pdf. 
 45. See New Listing Report 2006, supra note 15. 
 46. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at R. 7.01-.08.  The existing shareholders of 
seven companies sold some of their shares as part of the IPO in 2006.  These “sale” or 
“existing shares” were offered for sale by the existing shareholders of Fortune Sun 
(China) Holdings Limited (the shareholders of which sold 20.28 million “sale shares” 
during the IPO before the exercise of over-allotment options), Greentown China 
Holdings Limited (25.974 million), Hembly International Holdings Limited (7.2 
million), Smart Union Group (Holdings) Limited (12 million), AUPU Group Holding 
Company Limited (34 million), Neo-Neon Holdings Limited (40 million), and The 
Ming An (Holdings) Company Limited (99 million).  See id. 
 47. See New Listing Report 2006, supra note 15. 
 48. See Oliver, supra note 8.  The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 
attained the distinction of being the first company to be simultaneously listed on the 
SEHK and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  This amount of HK$125 billion pertains 
to that which the company raised on the SEHK. 
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provides further irrefutable 
evidence of the increasing importance of companies that are incorpora-
ted in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and to the continued 
prominence of the SEHK as one of the top ten stock exchanges globally 
in terms of market capitalization. 
Appendix I sets out the details of the fifty-three IPOs of 2006.  It is 
noteworthy that the top five fundraisers for the year collectively raised 
some HK$266 billion (US$34.1 billion), accounted for 80 percent of the 
total funds raised from IPOs during 2006, and all involved the sale of 
“H-shares”:  the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, 
Bank of China Limited, China Communications Construction Company 
Limited, China Coal Energy Company Limited and China Merchants 
Bank Company Limited.49  An emerging facet of IPOs in Hong Kong, 
particularly with the larger sized issues and those involving the sale of 
H-shares, is the increasing prominence of corporate investors, also re-
ferred to as “cornerstone investors”.  The practice of allocating a speci-
fied number of shares to cornerstone investors during an IPO in Hong 
Kong is substantially different from the practice of “spinning”,50 which 
was evident in the United States during the height of the dot-com tech-
nology boom of the late 1990s.51  In essence, “spinning” involves the 
directing of highly sought after shares during IPOs to preferred clients, 
assuring those clients of instant profits when they sell the shares im-
mediately upon the commencement of trading.52  In return, the under-
 49. See infra app. I.  Each of the top five IPOs raised more than HK$15 billion or 
US$1.923 billion.  In fact, the 17 H-Shares that were listed on the SEHK in 2006 raised 
a combined total of HK$290 billion (US$37.2 billion), accounting for approximately 
87.3 percent of the total funds raised for the year.  The two largest listings, namely 
those of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Bank of China, raised a 
combined total of HK$211.7 billion (US$27.1 billion), comprising about 73 percent of 
the total value of H-Share IPOs for 2006. 
 50. The data of cornerstone investors was hand collected and compiled with a 
review of all the prospectuses that were issued by companies seeking a listing over a 
five-year period from 2002 through 2006.  This desk survey by the author indicated a 
marked absence of such investors prior to the year 2006.  See, e.g., infra notes 60, 120-
25 [hereinafter Desk Survey]. 
 51. See Morrison & Foerster, “Spinning” IPO Shares: The eBay Decision, Feb. 
2004, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update1162.html [hereinafter eBay 
Decision]; see also News Release, NASD Charges Frank Quattrone with Spinning, 
Undermining Research Analyst Objectivity, Failure to Cooperate in Investigation (Mar. 
6, 2003), http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2003NewsReleases/NASDW 
_002948. 
 52. eBay Decision, supra note 51. 
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writers are promised lucrative advisory work or high commission trades 
on other stocks, a practice that has been viewed recently by the Supreme 
Court of New York as “a sophisticated form of bribery.”53 
The rationale for the introduction of cornerstone investors during 
IPOs is based on the perception that the credibility of some of the 
companies that are going public needs to be enhanced.54  Public in-
vestors may also be concerned about the standards of corporate govern-
ance practiced by the companies, as well as the level of transparency or 
reliability of their accounts.  The presence of household names as cor-
nerstone investors is thus often viewed as an implicit seal of approval, 
since the list includes some of the richest tycoons in Hong Kong.  By 
committing their own funds – or funds of companies in which they have 
controlling interest – and by agreeing not to dispose of the shares so 
allotted within a specified “lock-up” period55, these cornerstone inves-
tors boost confidence and deliver a positive signal to the market.  In 
addition, their participation reduces the number of shares that have to be 
sold on the open market, which not only promotes the success of the IPO 
but also upholds a degree of confidence in the stability of the company’s 
share price thereafter. 
Nevertheless, the presence of cornerstone investors raises two rela-
ted issues:  (i) whether such arrangements benefit the company going 
public, and (ii) whether they breach applicable regulations.  The ensuing 
sections of this Article argue that while the allocations to cornerstone 
investors do not breach the letter of the law if there is adequate dis-
closure of such arrangements, there is nonetheless a need to rethink the 
rules to enhance the principles of equity during an IPO.  This Article 
concludes with a proposal that strikes a balance between the interests of 
the various stakeholders, without requiring any burdensome change to 
the regulatory framework. 
 53. See State v. McLeod, 12 Misc. 3 1157(A), 1 (2006); State v. McLeod, 
Settlement Agreement in the Supreme Court of the State of New York (2006), available 
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/jul/McLeod%20Settlement%20Stipulation. 
pdf. 
 54. See infra notes 120-25. 
 55. The “lock-up” period refers to the period of time that the cornerstone investor 
agrees not to dispose of the shares and is the quid pro quo for being accorded a 
preferential status in the allotment of the shares by the company.  See infra note 59; see 
also Prospectus of the Bank of China, Ltd., supra note 18, at 114-19 (typical description 
of cornerstone investors and of the “lock up period”). 
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IV.  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INCIDENCE OF CORNERSTONE INVESTORS 
A company’s decision whether to invite the participation of corner-
stone investors in its IPO is essentially a commercial one.  The principal 
regulatory criterion is that the cornerstone investors must be independent 
from both the company and the controlling shareholders.56  Once the 
decision is made, the company and cornerstone investors enter into cor-
porate placing agreements in which the cornerstone investors irrevoca-
bly agree to subscribe for as many shares as may be purchased with a 
fixed amount of investment.  The exact number of shares ultimately de-
pends on the final price set for the IPO, and this number is then rounded 
down to the nearest “board lot” to facilitate trading.57 
All the pertinent details of these arrangements must be prominently 
disclosed in the prospectus.  To assess the extent of participation of cor-
nerstone investors, a desk survey was conducted of the prospectuses 
from the website of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, the pri-
mary purpose of which was to ascertain, among other things:  (a) the 
identity of the cornerstone investors and the quantum of their invest-
ment; (b) the number of shares that were placed to them and the restrict-
tions imposed thereon; and (c) the effect of such arrangements on both 
the institutional and retail tranches of the IPO.58  Table 1 below presents 
a snapshot of the results of the desk survey. 
 56. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, Rules 8.07-.08 (requirement for assuring an 
adequate and open market for the securities that are listed). 
 57. A “board lot” is the number of shares that are traded for a particular company 
through the electronic trading system of the SEHK.  There is no uniform size of board 
lots in Hong Kong; this number may be determined from time to time by the company.  
For example HSBC Holdings plc (Stock Code Number 5) has a trading board lot of 400 
shares while its 62 percent owned subsidiary Hang Seng Bank Limited (Stock Code 
Number 11) has a board lot of 100 shares. The trading of “odd lots”, namely where the 
quantity of shares do not amount to a “board lot”, is generally done over-the-counter 
between buyers and sellers.  See Hong Kong Exchs., Market Operations & Infra-
structure, http://www.hkex.com.hk/infra1.htm (last visited Feb 6, 2009) (for an over-
view of the securities trading and settlement systems in Hong Kong). 
 58. To facilitate the widest possible dissemination of pertinent corporate 
information, the prospectuses of companies that seek a listing on the SEHK are posted 
on the website of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing. See Listed Company 
Information Advanced Search – Current Securities, http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/ 
listconews/advancedsearch/search_active_main.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) [herein-
after Advanced Search – Current Securities]; see also Desk Survey, supra note 50. 
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Table 1: Participation of cornerstone investors in IPOs during 200659 
 
Name of company 
 
 
Amt sought 
from IPO 
(HK$B) 
 
Number of 
cornerstone 
investors 
 
 
Total amount 
committed 
(HK$M) 
 
Lock-up 
period 
(months) 
Nine Dragons Paper 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
$3.4 
(US$435.9m) 
3 $468 
(US$60m) 
6 
Bank of China Ltd.   
H-Shares 
$76.7 
(US$9.83b) 
12 $17,521 
(US$2,246m) 
12 
China BlueChemical 
Ltd. H-Shares 
$2.66 
(US$341m) 
4 $646 
(US$82.8m) 
9 
Industrial & 
Commercial Bank of 
China Ltd. H-Shares 
$108.65 
(US$13.93b) 
13 $30,800 
(US$3,948.7m) 
12 
Zhaojin Mining 
Industry Co. Ltd. 
H-Shares 
 
$2.19 
(US$280.1m) 
 
4 
 
$341 
(US$43.7m) 
 
6 
China 
Communications 
Construction Co. 
Ltd. H-Shares 
 
$16.1 
(US$2.06b) 
 
3 
 
$1,950 
(US$250m) 
 
12 
Shanghai Jin Jiang 
Int’l Hotels (Group) 
Co. Ltd. H-Shares 
 
$2.42 
(US$310.3m) 
2 $312 (US$40m) 6 
China Coal Energy 
Co. Ltd. H-Shares 
$13.15b 
(US$1.69b) 
5 $1,950 
(US$250m) 
12 
 
Appendix II sets out the beneficial owners of cornerstone investors 
and the size of their individual investments as published in the pro-
spectuses.  The last column calculates the approximate percentage of all 
the shares from the IPO that was allotted to these investors based on the 
final offer price as announced by the company.  The ensuing paragraphs 
review some of the more significant features of these arrangements in 
Hong Kong. 
 
 59. See Advanced Search – Current Securities, supra note 58; see also Desk 
Survey, supra note 50.  The stock codes for the companies in Table 1 are Nine Dragons 
Paper (2689), Bank of China (3988), China BlueChemical (3983), ICBC (1398), 
Zhaojing Mining (1818), China Communications Construction (1800), Shanghai Jin 
Jiang (2006) and China Coal (1898).  For links to electronic copies of each of the listed 
companies’ prospectuses, see infra note 75. 
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A.  Who are the cornerstone investors? 
The cornerstone investors are among the “Who’s Who” in Hong 
Kong and figure prominently among its richest citizens.60  Individuals 
from the January 2007 Forbes Asia list included Dr. Lee Shau Kee, who 
ranked second with a net worth estimated at US$16.5 billion;61 Dato Dr. 
Cheng Yu Tung who ranked seventh with a net worth of US$6.5 billion; 
Mr. Peter Woo Kwong Ching, whose US$2.7 billion placed him four-
teenth on the list; and Mr. Chen Din Hwa, who came close behind with 
US$2.6 billion.62  Although not on the Greater China list, the presence 
of Mr. Kuok Hock Nien is also significant as he ranked among the 
richest people in the world with diversified business interests in 
plantations, media, hotels and property.63 
 
A number of prominent companies that are listed on the SEHK also 
appear consistently on the list of cornerstone investors.  These include 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited and its subsidiary Hutchison 
Whampoa Limited, which boasts Dr. Li Ka Shing, the richest man in 
Hong Kong as of January 2007, as its controlling shareholder.64  The list 
also includes Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited, which is controlled by 
the Kwok brothers,65 and Chinese Estates Holdings Limited, which is 
run by Mr. Joseph Lau.66 
 60. See Greater China’s Richest: The Top 40, FORBES ASIA, Jan. 29 2007, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/global/2007/0129/035.html [hereinafter China’s 
Top 40]. 
 61. It is telling that the reference to Dr. Lee in Forbes Asia reads as follows:  
“Made fortune in property as founder of Henderson Land. Adding to wealth through 
investments in such recent IPOs as Nine Dragons.”  Dr. Lee who is known as “Hong 
Kong’s Warren Buffet” in the market has been widely reported in the local media as 
saying that there is more profit to be made in equities than in property development.  
See Jeffrey Tam, Lee Talks Up Equities for New Year, THE STANDARD, Jan. 2, 2007, at 
A3; Danny Chung, Lee Focus Pledge, THE STANDARD, Dec. 13 2006, at A1. 
 62. See China’s Top 40, supra note 60. 
 63. See The World’s Richest People: #114 Robert Kuok, FORBES.COM, http://www. 
forbes.com/lists/2006/10/ARHN.html (with an estimated net worth of about US$5 
billion Mr. Kuok ranked as 114th in the world in 2006). 
 64. See China’s Top 40, supra note 60.  Forbes Asia estimated the net worth of Dr. 
Li to be about US$22 billion.  Id. 
 65. Id.  The brothers Raymond, Thomas and Walter Kwok are collectively esti-
mated to be worth an estimated US$14 billion by Forbes Asia, which places them as the 
third richest in Hong Kong. 
 66. Id.  At an estimated net worth of US$1.95 billion, Mr. Lau ranks 23rd on the 
Forbes list.  He recently set a world record for purchasing the most expensive Andy 
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Tycoons aside, yet another group of prominent cornerstone inves-
tors to emerge in 2006 was state-owned investment companies, which 
include the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation67 the 
Kuwait Investment Authority68 and the Qatar Investment Authority.69  
Together, these three entities purchased HK$10 billion (US$1.28 billion) 
of shares during the IPO of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China Limited, and were allotted about 9.19 percent of all of the shares 
offered.70  In addition, the Mainland Chinese government-controlled 
China Life Insurance (Group) Company Limited and its SEHK-listed 
subsidiary, China Life Insurance Company Limited, were featured as 
cornerstone investors in four of the IPOs: Bank of China Limited, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Com-
munications Construction Company Limited and China Coal Energy 
Company Limited.71 
B.  Lock-up period 
The “lock-up” period refers to the duration of time following the 
listing date during which cornerstone investors are not permitted – di-
rectly or indirectly – to dispose of the shares that they have been allotted 
during the IPO.72  The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the 
shares are not “flipped” for immediate profit akin the practice of 
“spinning” described above.  This restriction, however, does not appear 
to be an absolute prohibition since its language allows for a degree of 
flexibility, enabling early disposals of the shares by cornerstone 
 
Warhol painting, “Mao”, for US$17.5 million.  Id. 
 67. Government of Singapore Investment Corp. (GIC), http://www.gic.com.sg (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2009). 
 68. Kuwait Investment Authority, http://www.kia.gov.kw (last visited Feb. 15, 
2009). 
 69. The Qatar Investment Authority, http://www.qia.qa/QIA (last visited Feb. 15, 
2009). 
 70. See ICBC IPO Announcement Result, http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/list 
conews/sehk/20061026/1398/F104.pdf (highlighting the allocation to corporate (corner-
stone) investors).  The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation was also a 
cornerstone investor in China Communications Construction Company, Ltd., where it 
received about 4.03 percent of all of the shares sold during the IPO in return for its 
investment of HK$650 million, or about US$83.33 million. Id. 
 71. See Desk Survey, supra note 50; Table 1, supra note 59. 
 72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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investors with the company’s consent.  For example, the prospectus of 
Bank of China Limited – H-Share states that: 
Each Corporate Investor and its respective investor parent (if any) 
has agreed that, without our prior written consent or that of the Joint 
Global Coordinators, it will not, whether directly or indirectly, at any 
time during the period of twelve months following the Listing Date, 
dispose of any H Shares subscribed pursuant to the International 
Offering (or any interest in any company or entity holding any of the 
H Shares), other than transfers to another company which is and will 
remain wholly-owned by the Corporate Investor or its investor 
parent or, in certain cases, its holding company, and such transfer 
can only be made when the transferee agrees to be subject to the 
restrictions on disposals imposed on the Corporate Investor.73 
The prospectuses of seven other companies whose IPOs had corner-
stone investors featured language similar to the foregoing condition, 
save for some differences in the ‘lock up’ period.74 The term “Corporate 
Investor” was used by all but one of the companies, the exception being 
Shanghai Jin Jiang International Hotels (Group) Company Limited 
which used the term “Cornerstone Investor” in its prospectus.75 
Although the lock-up period for China BlueChemical Limited was 
ostensibly nine months, a closer review of its terms reveals a clause that 
mitigated its restrictiveness.  The cornerstone investor 
may freely transfer or otherwise dispose of such number of H Shares 
that constitute up to 50 percent of the H Shares subscribed for pur-
suant to the relevant corporate placing agreement without the con-
sent of our Company and the Joint Global Coordinators at any time 
 73. See Prospectus of the Bank of China, Ltd., supra note 18, at 119. 
 74. See Nine Dragons Paper (2689) 138, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/ 
listedco/listconews/sehk/20060220/02689/EWP117.pdf; China BlueChemical (3983) 
266-67, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060918/0398 
3/EWP125.pdf; ICBC (1398) 101, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listco 
news/sehk/20061016/01398/EWP114.pdf; Zhaojing Mining (1818) 101, available at  
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20061124/01818/F116.pdf; China 
Communications Construction (1800) 67, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco 
/listconews/sehk/20061201/1800/F115_e.pdf; Shanghai Jin Jiang (2006) 278, available 
at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20061130/02006/EWP126.pdf; 
China Coal (1898) 224, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/ 
20061206/1898/F124_e.pdf. 
 75. Supra note 74. 
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and from time to time after the date falling six months from the 
Listing Date.76 
The effective lock-up period was therefore six months for half of 
the shares allotted and nine months for the balance, and may be further 
varied with the consent of the company.77 
Except as disclosed in the prospectus, there was no requirement for 
either the company or its cornerstone investors to provide information 
regarding any granting of approval for disposals of shares within the 
lock-up period.78  Furthermore, as their equity holding was invariably 
below five percent of the issued capital of the company, cornerstone in-
vestors were not classified as “substantial shareholders,” which are re-
quired to disclose acquisitions and disposals of their shares.79  Taken to-
gether, these factors contributed to an undesirable lack of transparency 
for share transactions by cornerstone investors within the lock-up period, 
as their activities may have ranged from the purchase of shares or, with 
the written consent of the company, a sale of shares within the initial 
allocation of shares from the IPO. 
C.  Preferred and guaranteed allotment 
In return for their commitments, cornerstone investors are accorded 
priority status in the allotment of shares during IPOs.  Corporate placing 
agreements include the following term: 
The Offer Shares to be subscribed by each of the Corporate Investors 
will not be affected by any reallocation of the Offer Shares between 
the International Offering and the Hong Kong Public Offering in the 
event of over-subscription under the Hong Kong Public Offering as 
described.80 
 
 76. See China BlueChemical (3983) 266-67, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/ 
listedco/listconews/sehk/20060918/03983/EWP125.pdf. 
 77. See id. 
 78. As the arrangement for cornerstone investors is by definition a private contract 
between the company, its underwriters and the investor, this information is not subject 
to any further disclosure, save for what appears in the prospectus as well as the 
announcement on the IPO Allotment Results. 
 79. See Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, supra note 22, § 15. 
 80. Prospectus of the Bank of China, Ltd., supra note 18, at 114.  The prospectuses 
of the other seven companies whose IPOs had cornerstone investors contained the same 
statement or words to similar effect. 
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The allotment of shares to cornerstone investors is thus contractu-
ally guaranteed and the only aspect that remains to be determined is the 
final offer price used for the computation of the number of shares.  This 
preferred allotment is not affected by the rate of oversubscription for the 
Hong Kong Public Offer that triggers the application of the “clawback” 
provisions of Practice Note 18.81  In short, the parties who would lose 
out from any reallocation of shares from the International Offer Share 
tranche to the Hong Kong Offer Share tranche would be institutional 
investors who are not accorded the status of cornerstone investors. 
While the provisions of Practice Note 18 effectively require the 
company to disclose the rate of oversubscription for the retail tranche of 
its IPO, there is no corresponding requirement for the company to do so 
for its International Offer Share portion.  Instead of providing a precise 
number, companies may choose to use terms such as “significantly”, 
“substantially” or “well” oversubscribed to describe the institutional 
demand.  This makes it difficult to quantify the overall demand for the 
shares of a company during its IPO.82  Indeed, the International Offer 
Shares portion of seven of the eight IPOs that involved cornerstone 
investors in 2006 were “very substantially over-subscribed,” making it 
reasonable to draw two conclusions.83  First, there was substantially 
more demand than supply of shares, which in turn means that all insti-
tutional investors likely received fewer shares than they had sought.  
Second, these investors would seek to rebalance their investment port-
folios through the acquisition of additional shares on the open market 
when trading commenced.  All else being equal, this demand virtually 
guaranteed that the shares would experience a strong performance in 
terms of price to the benefit of those who were fortunate enough to be 
allotted shares during the IPO. 
Notably, the average rate of oversubscription for the retail tranche 
of the eight IPOs that had cornerstone investors in 2006 was about 308 
times.84  Under normal circumstances, this would require a readjustment 
of the number of Hong Kong Public Offer Shares to 50 percent of the 
 81. See PRACTICE NOTE 18, supra note 38; see also infra discussion in the section 
titled “Waiver of Practice Note 18.” 
 82. See infra Table 2; see also infra note 92. 
 83. Id.  The exception is Zhaojin Mining Industry Company, Ltd., which reported 
that the International Offer Shares tranche of its IPO was “significantly over-
subscribed.”  Id. 
 84. Computed by author as an average based on the actual rates of over-
subscriptions as set out in Table 2. 
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total number of shares available during the IPO, thus further decreasing 
the number of shares that institutional investors – excluding cornerstone 
investors – could expect to receive under the International Offer Share 
portion.85  It is against this background that the guarantee of allocation 
of shares to cornerstone investors is particularly significant, especially 
coming as it did during a year when the average rate of oversubscription 
of the Hong Kong Public Offer portion exceeded 250 times, with the 
retail tranche of at least ten IPOs being over-subscribed by 500 times or 
more.86 
Collectively, cornerstone investors were allotted an average of al-
most 28 percent of the adjusted number of International Offer Shares 
from the eight IPOs in which they participated.87  This ranged from ap-
proximately 15.1 percent for China Communications Construction 
Company Limited – H-Share, to 48.5 percent for China BlueChemical 
Limited – H-Share.88  The latter is especially significant, as there were 
only four cornerstone investors who were able to secure almost one-half 
of all the International Offer Shares with a collective investment of 
about HK$646 million (US$82.8 million) despite the company’s an-
nouncement that this tranche was “very significantly over-subscribed”.89  
Of more fundamental importance is the fact that the engagement of 
cornerstone investors by companies concentrated shareholdings in the 
hands of a select and privileged few, rather than ensuring the widest 
possible base of shareholders. 
 85. See PRACTICE NOTE 18, supra note 38. Cornerstone investors therefore enjoy a 
preferential status since their allocation is fixed and is not subject to any reduction 
regardless of the rate of over subscription for the retail tranche unlike other institutional 
investors.  In return, however, the cornerstone investors agree not to dispose of their 
shares within a specified lock-in period. 
 86. See C. K. Low, Initial Public Offerings and Interest Income in Hong Kong, 18 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 559 (2007). 
 87. Table 2 sets out the statistics from hand-collected data from various announce-
ments by the company, including its prospectus and IPO Allotment Results. The ad-
justed number of shares reflects the reallocation to the retail tranche based on the claw-
back provisions of Practice Note 18, but excludes any shares that the company may sub-
sequently issue to institutional investors under the green shoe over allotment option.  
See infra section titled “Waiver of Practice Note 18.” 
 88. See infra section titled “Waiver of Practice Note 18.” 
 89. See China BlueChemical, Ltd., IPO Allotment Results, available at 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060928/LTN20060928001.htm. 
The four cornerstone investors were allotted an aggregate of about 24.27 percent of the 
total number of shares offered in the IPO before the exercise of the green shoe over 
allotment option by the underwriters. 
658 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
Table 2 below provides a succinct summary of the preferred posi-
tions of cornerstone investors who were guaranteed allotments of shares 
from the International Offer Share portion of IPOs in 2006. 
 
Table 2: Clawback effect of application of Practice Note 1890 
Name of 
company 
Rate of over 
subscription 
for Hong 
Kong Offer 
Shares 
Revised 
number of 
Int’l Offer 
Shares 
(Millions) 
Rate of over 
subscription for 
International 
Offer Shares 
Percentage of 
International 
Offer Shares 
allotted to 
cornerstone 
investors 
Nine Dragons 
Paper (Holdings) 
Limited 
520.45 500 
Very 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 
27.52 
Bank of China 
Ltd. H-Share 70.9 23,011.731 
Very 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 
25.8 
China 
BlueChemical 
Ltd. H-Share 
477.56 700 
Very 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 
48.57 
Industrial & 
Commercial 
Bank of China 
Ltd. H-Share 
75.74 31,851.9 
Very 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 
31.49 
 
Zhaojin Mining 
Industry Co. Ltd. 
H-Share 
535.75 
 86.4 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 31.12 
China 
Communications 
Construction Co. 
Ltd. H-Share 
219.97 
 2,800 
Very 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 
15.13 
Shanghai Jin 
Jiang 
International 
Hotels (Group) 
Co. Ltd. H-Share 
382.18 
 550 
Very 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 
25.78 
China Coal 
Energy Co. Ltd. 
H-Share 
182.08 2,597.098 
Very 
Significantly 
Oversubscribed 
18.48 
 
 
 90. See Desk Survey, supra note 50. 
2009 CORNERSTONE INVESTORS 659 
 AND INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
D.  Waiver of Practice Note 18 
Four companies, namely Bank of China Limited, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Communications 
Construction Company Limited, and China Coal Energy Company 
Limited, sought and received a waiver from strict compliance of Practice 
Note 18, thus amplifying the share concentration effects that cornerstone 
investors had during the 2006 IPOs.91  The underlying rationale for the 
waiver was that it is generally more difficult and costly to market large-
sized IPOs to retail investors.92  Given the uncertainty of demand for the 
Hong Kong Offer Share portion, it was deemed more prudent to reduce 
the initial size of this tranche and reallocate these shares to the Inter-
national Offer Share tranche because interest from institutional investors 
is relatively easier to ascertain from the road shows that the company 
conducts.93 
These waivers work at two levels. 94  First, the Hong Kong Public 
Offer Shares portion of the IPO is halved from the usual ten percent to 
five percent.  Second, in the event of significant oversubscription of the 
retail tranche, the reallocation, or “clawback”, from the International 
Offer Shares portion is substantially reduced from its customary levels 
under Practice Note 18.  Such waivers were relatively uncommon prior 
to 2006, as only eight were granted in total.  One such waiver was grant-
ed in each of the years 2001, 2002 and 2003; two were granted in 2004 
and three in 2005.95  Their popularity has increased steadily in recent 
 
 91. This data was hand-collected by the author from a review of the prospectuses 
of the companies.  The waiver was also granted to a fifth company, China Merchants 
Bank Co., Ltd., but this is not pertinent to the current discussions as its IPO did not have 
any cornerstone investors.  It is interesting to note, however, that these are coincidental-
ly the five largest IPOs for 2006.  See Structure of Global Offering 352-54, available at 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060908/03968/EWP124.pdf. 
 92. The usual practice of the SEHK is to consider such Practice Note 18 waiver 
applications only where the size of the IPO exceeds HK$10 billion, or US$1.28 billion, 
before the exercise of the green shoe over-allotment option. This practice is consistent 
with Rule 8.08(1)(d) which allows for the exercise of discretion on the part of the 
SEHK to reduce the public shareholding base to 15 percent of the issued capital of a 
company which market capitalization is expected to exceed HK$10 billion on its listing.  
See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at R. 8.08. 
 93. Based on market observation from discussions with investment bankers. 
 94. See infra note 101. 
 95. From a review of prospectuses the waivers were previously granted to 
CNOOC, Ltd., in 2001, China Telecom, Ltd. in 2002, China Life Insurance, Ltd. in 
2003, SMIC Ltd. and Ping An Insurance, Ltd. in 2005, and China Construction Bank, 
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years, however, congruent with the listings of larger Mainland Chinese 
enterprises on the SEHK. 
The table below illustrates the effect that such waivers have in 
markedly reducing the number of shares that would otherwise be 
available for subscription by retail investors thereby depriving them of a 
higher degree of participation especially for the ‘hot’ IPOs that were 
prevalent in 2006. 
 
Table 3: Effect of waivers of Practice Note 18 on  
Hong Kong Offer Share portion of IPO96 
 
 
Initial 
percentage 
of IPO set 
aside for 
Hong Kong 
Public Offer 
Clawback 
adjustment for 
oversubscription 
of between 
15 and 50 times 
Clawback 
adjustment for 
oversubscription 
of between 
50 to 100 times 
Clawback 
adjustment if 
oversubscription 
exceeds 100 
times 
Normal 
Practice 
10% 30% 40% 50% 
With 
waivers 
5% 7.5% 10% 20% 
 
One consequence of granting such waivers is the retail frenzy that is 
generated over IPOs.  As with the company, retail investors face the 
uncertainty of not knowing what the demand will eventually be for the 
Public Offer Shares, as this will only be determined at the close of the 
IPO.  Recognizing that the size of the “clawback” provisions is reduced 
in tandem with the initial allocation for the retail tranche of the IPO, 
investors have turned increasingly towards the use of margin 
finan
 
cing.97 
Ltd., China Shenhua Ltd. and Bank of Communications, Ltd. in 2005. All of the 
foregoing are H Shares.  See supra note 75 (providing links to electronic copies of each 
of the listed companies’ prospectuses). 
 96. The figures presented in this Table are based on announcements by brokers 
concerning the provision of such financing during IPOs and the author’s experience. 
 97. The term “margin financing” refers to the amount of money that investors 
borrow for the purposes of purchasing securities, which includes shares offered during 
IPOs.  See The Free Dictionary, Financial Dictionary, Margin, http://financial-diction 
ary.thefreedictionary.com/Margin (last visited Feb. 6, 2009); Deacons, Tightening 
Securities Margin Financing in Hong Kong (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.hg.org/ 
articles/article_468.html. 
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ion 
fees 
tor 
one board lot of 1,000 shares to encourage them to apply for its IPO. 
As the shares of China Coal Energy Company Limited IPO’d at 
HK$4.05 and closed at HK$4.56 at the end of its first day of trading on 
the SEHK,98 an investor with one board lot of shares would have made a 
gross profit of approximately HK$510, assuming that he or she managed 
to sell the shares at the closing price.  This profit, however, does not take 
into account the costs, the principal components of which would include 
brokerage for both subscribing for and selling the shares, applicat
(if any) and the interest that is incurred on the margin financing. 
The following table illustrates the effects that the waivers may have 
had indirectly on contributing to increases in the size of the applications 
– and the costs thereof – to the retail investor just to be assured of being 
allocated one board lot of shares.  It should be noted that Bank of China 
Limited pursued a policy which guaranteed every single retail inves
 
Tab e 4: Size and cost of application to be assured allotment of one board l
lot where waivers of Practice Note 18 have been granted by the SEHK99 
 
Name of company 
N  
for to b  one 
b t 
su
umber of shares to apply
e assured of
oard lo
Cost of 
bscription 
(HK$) 
Bank of China Ltd. H-Share 1000 303 30 0. 
Industrial and Commercial 
B 6000 18,606.04 ank of China Ltd. H-Share 
China Communications  
ion CoConstruct . Ltd. H- 20000 92,928.28 
Share 
China Co Co. Ltd. 25000 102,2 1.61 al Energy H-Share 
7
 
China k Co. 
Ltd. H-Share 5000 
43,1 .78 
 
Merchants Ban 81
 
The foregoing analysis raises three questions that may be posed by 
retail investors.  First, is the waiver of Practice Note 18 necessary or 
 
 98. See Yahoo! Finance, www.finance.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2009); 
China Coal Energy Co. Lists in Hong Kong, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 19, 2006, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200612/19/eng20061219_334087.html. 
 99. The details as set out in Table 4 were hand collected from the IPO Allotment 
Results announcements by the companies.  Disclosure as set out under the “Basis of 
Allotment under the Hong Kong Public Share Offering” was examined to determine the 
level of application required to secure the allotment of one board lot of shares. 
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d of being allotted one board lot of the shares of the com-
pany?100 
E.  Bottom line: How profitable is it to be a cornerstone investor?
equitable?  Second, should such a waiver be granted in cases that in-
volve cornerstone investors who are assured of being allotted a signi-
ficant number of these highly sought after shares?  Lastly, why should 
investors who put up all of their application monies up-front be subject 
to such uncertainties, especially in view of the investments necessary to 
be assure
 
g the lock-up 
perio
 
There is no dispute that cornerstone investors expose themselves to 
a degree of risk that is inherent in any IPO.  For example, the issue may 
not be well received by other investors or it may be affected by exter-
nalities, either before the listing of the company or durin
d, that may cause a decline in the price of the shares. 
This risk appeared to be neither material nor substantial, however, 
at least during the 2006 IPO boom.  Concededly, as of December 31, 
2006, the lock-up period had only expired for one of the eight IPOs, 
Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings) Limited, whose shares closed at 
HK$6.97 on September 4, 2006, the first trading day after the lock-up 
period.101  Had the three cornerstone investors sold all of their share-
holdings at that price on that day, they would have more than doubled 
their money on the investment with a collective profit estimated at 
HK$491.4 million before costs.102  Nevertheless, the cornerstone invest-
tors would have done much better had they kept their shareholdings 
through the end of 2006, as the company was the best performing IPO of 
 100. In the interest of full disclosure, the author was appointed as a member of the 
Listing Committee of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong on May 19, 2006 and has 
participated in the hearings of a number of listing applications as well as of other issues 
since then.  The views expressed in this Article are solely and exclusively those of the 
author in his personal capacity. 
 101. See Yahoo! Finance, supra note 98; see also UK & Ireland Yahoo! Finance, 
Nine Dragons Paper Historical Prices (Sept. 4, 2006), http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/q/hp 
?s=N3Y.BE&b=4&a=08&c=2006&e=4&d=08&f=2006 (listing the historical share 
price for Sept. 4, 2006 in United Kingdom currency). 
 102. As they are not defined as substantial shareholders of the company the 
cornerstone investors are under no obligation to notify the company and/or the SEHK of 
the sale of their shares.  The profit of some US$63 million is based on the three corner-
stone investors being collectively allotted about 137.64 million shares in return for the 
US$60 million that they invested.  The profit would have been HK$3.57 for each share, 
ignoring transaction costs. 
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f the 
com  listed on the SEHK from December 2006.104 
able 5: Return on investment fo ne i  in 2006
the year.  Its shares closed at HK$13.40 on December 29, 2006, repre-
senting a 294 percent premium over its IPO price.103  The following 
table highlights the gross unrealized gains attained by the cornerstone 
investors of the other seven IPOs in which they participated.  These 
gains are particularly impressive when one considers that three o
panies were only
 
T r cornersto nvestors 105 
Name of company IPO Date 
IP r 
(  
s  
12 6 investment 
 
O Offe
Price 
HK$)
Closing 
hare price
/29/0
% gain on 
Bank Ltd.  6/01/06 2.95 4.27 44.75  of China H-Share 
China B al Ltd.  9/29/06 1.90 3.15 65.79 lueChemicH-Share 
I l 
Bank of Ltd. H- 10/27/06 3.07 4.83 57.33 
ndustrial & Commercia
 China 
Share 
Zha try 12/08/06 12.68 15.52 22.4 ojin Mining IndusCo. Ltd. H-Share 
Ch ns 
12/15/06 4.60 7.69 67.17 
in io
Construction 
a Communicat
Co. Ltd. H-Share 
Shanghai Jin Jiang Int’l 
(Group) CHotels o. Ltd. 12/15/06 2.20 3.73 69.55 
H-Share 
Chin  Co. 12/19/06 a Coal EnergyLtd. H-Share 4.05 5.05 24.69 
Avg.  gain to end 2006  N/A N/A 50.24  %
 
 103. The last trading day for the year was December 29, 2006. If the cornerstone 
investors had sold all of their shareholdings at the closing price for the day, they would 
have had HK$10, or US$1.28, per share for a collective gross profit of about HK$1.37 
billion, or US$176.4 million. 
 104. Bank of China, Ltd. was listed on the SEHK on June 1st, China BlueChemical, 
Ltd., on September 29th, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China on October 
27th, while Zhaojin Mining Industry Company, Ltd. and China Communications 
Construction Company, Ltd., Shanghai Jin Jiang International Hotels (Group) Company 
Ltd. and China Coal Energy Company Ltd., were listed on December 8th, 15th and 19th 
of 2006, respectively.  TodayIR, http://www.todayir.com/e/ipo_2006.php (last visited 
February 15, 2009).  The lock-up periods for these companies had not expired as of 
December 31, 2006.  See Table 1 infra and Appendix I supra. 
 105. See New Listing Report 2006, supra note 15 (setting out the IPO Date and IPO 
Offer Price).  The closing price is obtained from Yahoo! Finance, www.finance. 
yahoo.com. 
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s averaging more than 22 percent for the fifty-
three
ct to mani-
pulation aimed at distorting the price discovery mechanism. 
 
 
The foregoing provides a succinct snapshot of the enviable rates of 
return achieved by the cornerstone investors in the months or weeks 
since their initial investments in the companies.  Admittedly, these 
figures did not represent realized gains, as the cornerstone investors 
were obliged to retain these shares through the end of the lock-up period 
unless the company consented in writing to an earlier disposal of the 
same.  Furthermore, the high rates of return may have been influenced 
by the general upward trend of the market.  Nonetheless, these figures 
provide strong evidence of the potentially significant profits to be made 
by cornerstone investors, especially in markets similar to the SEHK in 
2006, with first day return
 IPOs in that year.106 
The closing price of the shares on December 29, 2006 is used for 
two principal reasons.  First, it allows for the identification of a con-
venient and specific point of comparison to ensure consistency while 
contemporaneously reflecting the interaction between market demand 
and supply.  Second, there is usually no provision of an official opening 
price for a particular share by the stock exchange on which it is traded.  
The closest to an official opening price might be the figure determined 
by the single-auction pricing process during the pre-opening session.  
For example, in the year 2002 the SEHK introduced the “Bid and Ask 
Record” with the principal objective of assisting in the determination of 
fair opening prices for shares, by disseminating 30-second snapshots of 
the equilibrium prices during the pre-opening session for each share, 
with the last equilibrium price before actual market opening adopted as 
the best estimate of the single-auction price.107  This is not necessarily a 
transaction price, however, and the process may be subje
 106. See Low, supra note 17, at 101; see also Sundeep Tucker, Hong Kong Warned 
of Chinese IPO Dependence, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d9634 
f66-a4ef-11db-b0ef-0000779e2340,dwp_uuid=9c33700c-4c86-11da-89df-0000779e23 
40.html (acknowledging and describing how the listings of Mainland Chinese com-
panies have benefited the development of the SEHK). 
 107. HKEx Data Products, Product Subscription, https://www.hkex.com.hk/ods/ 
English/asp/prdProfile.asp?prd=000000096&groupID=000000100&scheme=1 (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
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V.  RETHINKING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Cornerstone investors have contributed to the development of the 
market particularly during the initial listings of increasingly larger sized 
Mainland Chinese companies at the turn of the new millennium.  Their 
participation helped provide the necessary confidence and stability of 
share price without which the H-Share market might not be as buoyant 
as it is today. 
A case in point is that of China Telecom Corporation Limited, 
whose IPO in November 2001 was marred by unfavorable market con-
ditions and fundamental management errors, including the release of 
earnings forecasts and information on planned acquisitions that were not 
in the prospectus.108  These factors contributed to the lackluster response 
to its IPO, with an International Share Offer portion that was described 
as being “fully subscribed” while the retail tranche was only 3.6 times 
covered.109  In that case, commentators noted that the investment of 
US$50 million by Hutchison Whampoa Limited, a telecom and port 
conglomerate controlled by Dr. Li Ka Shing, was “seen as a vote of 
confidence in China Telecom by the territory’s retail investors.”110 
Although the Listing Rules do not specifically deal with the subject, 
the issue of cornerstone investors is neither recent nor novel.  Indeed, the 
topic has been canvassed in a number of publications with headlines, 
including: “HK Tycoons Pledge $500m for China Life IPO”;111 
“Tycoons Get China Netcom IPO Rolling with $1.1b Pledge”;112 “Hong 
 108. See China Telecom Corp., Ltd.  1, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listed 
co/listconews/sehk/20021114/LTN20021114035.pdf. 
 109. Id. (using the term “fully subscribed” suggests a weak demand with the order 
book possibly barely filled, despite the International Offer Shares being fully placed by 
the underwriters). 
 110. See, e.g., Joe Leahy, Li Puts $50m into China Telecom IPO, FIN. TIMES 
LONDON, Nov. 8, 2002, at 30.  The IPO had to be priced at the lowest end of its indi-
cative range of between prices.  The company was set at HK$1.47 per H-Share.  If 
Hutchison Whampoa, Ltd. had held on to all of the shares allotted through the end of 
2006, it would have achieved gross return on its investment of approximately 190 
percent over five years, as the price of China Telecom Corp., Ltd., closed at HK$4.26 
on December 29th, 2006. 
 111. See Joe Leahy, Angela MacKay & Francesco Guerrera, HK Tycoons Pledge 
$500m for China Life IPO, FIN. TIMES LONDON, Dec. 5, 2003, at 1. 
 112. See Hui Yuk-min & Nicole Chan, Tycoons Get China Netcom IPO Rolling with 
$1.1B Pledge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at 1. 
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Kong Elite Score on IPO”;113 “Chinese IPO Gets Star Investors”;114 and 
“Front Running in China”.115  Taking a cue from these publications 
(albeit not alluding specifically to cornerstone investors), the Listing 
Committee of the SEHK in its 2006 Annual Report formed the opinion 
that: 
While the Committee does not consider pre-IPO placings shortly 
before listing to be objectionable, the Committee considered that 
preferential investment terms available only to pre-IPO investors 
may at times be inconsistent with the principle that all holders of 
listed securities are to be treated fairly and equally, memorialized in 
Rule 2.03.  This would particularly be the case in circumstances 
where the terms of the pre-IPO investment meant that private equity 
investors would not have experienced equity risks significantly 
different from those experienced by public investors, or would be 
protected from certain types of equity risks after listing in a manner 
that was significantly different from that experienced by public 
investors.  In such cases the Committee considered it appropriate to 
require the preferential terms to be removed or altered prior to listing 
in order to satisfy the principles of Rule 2.03.116 
To the extent they apply, the General Principles of Rule 2.03 
require that “all holders of listed securities are treated fairly and 
equally”117 as the rules attempt to secure for securities holders certain 
assurances and equality of treatment which their legal positions might 
not otherwise provide.  But, while the ambit of Rule 2.03 and the issue 
of pre-IPO placements have been considered in a number of separate 
Listing Decisions,118 none of these pertain to the specific circumstances 
of cornerstone investors. 
 113. See Kate Linebaugh, Star Treatment, supra note 18. 
 114. See Kate Linebaugh, Star Investors, supra note 18. 
 115. See Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Front-Running in China, FORBES, Dec. 1, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/12/01/china-ipo-investors-biz-cx_jc_1201china 
ipo.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 116. See THE LISTING COMM, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 7, para. 26 (2006), available at 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/listing/listcomrpt/AnnualRpt_2006.pdf. 
 117. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, R. 2.03(4), at 2-2, available at http://www.hk 
ex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_2.pdf. 
 118. See Listing Decision HKEx-LD55-1 (June 2006), http://www.hkex.com.hk/ 
listing/listdec/listdec_dates_06_07.htm; Listing Decision HKEx-LD56-1 (Sept. 2006), 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/listing/listdec/listdec_dates_06_08.htm (reaffirming the views 
of Listing Decision HKEx-LD36-1 (Oct. 2003), http://www.hkex.com.hk/listing/listdec/ 
200310-1.doc). 
2009 CORNERSTONE INVESTORS 667 
 AND INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
 
The discussion thus far highlights significant issues for policy-
makers and securities regulators in Hong Kong to resolve.  First, is the 
risk of having a less than definitive lock-up period a fair trade for the 
certainty of securing shares in highly sought after IPOs?  Second, does 
the perpetuation of a system that enables cornerstone investors to be ac-
corded privileged status in the allotment of shares facilitate or impair the 
further development of the market?  Lastly, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, does this issue pertain to the freedom of contract between com-
panies and their underwriters in the lead up to an IPO, or has it become 
an issue of circumventing the Listing Rules by contract? 
One possible solution would be to refine the ambit of Practice Note 
18 by expressly stating that the preferential allocation of shares before or 
during an IPO would prima facie be presumed to be inconsistent with 
the fair and equitable principles of the Listing Rules.  This approach is 
preferred for two principal reasons.  First, a Practice Note issued pur-
suant to Rule 1.06 is intended “to assist issuers . . . or their advisers in 
interpreting and complying with these Exchange Listing Rules.”119  
Such an approach has the advantages of familiarity, expediency and 
flexibility, as practitioners have adhered to the procedures and processes 
since the introduction of Practice Note 18 in June 1998.  It does not 
completely prohibit participation by cornerstone investors, but rather, it 
puts a burden on the company and its advisers to rebut the presumption 
with substantial quantitative and qualitative assessments that are suffi-
ciently objective to enable the Listing Committee of the SEHK to con-
sider the merits of such an application. 
Furthermore, as the foregoing does not involve any amendments to 
the Listing Rules, it is unnecessary to undergo the time consuming pro-
cedure set out in Rule 2.05, which provides that any such amendments 
must be “subject to the approval of the Commission under section 24 of 
the Securities and Futures Ordinance.”120  Section 24 of the Securities 
and Futures Ordinance requires the SEHK to provide, inter alia, explana-
tions of the purpose as well as the likely effects of such amendments,121 
which invariably necessitates a public consultation on the issue.  Such 
exercises tend to be cumbersome and fraught with conflicting opinions, 
 119. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, R. 1.06, at 1-14, available at http://www.hk 
ex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_1.pdf.http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_
1.pdf. 
 120. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2.  The term ‘Commission’ refers to the 
Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong. 
 121. See supra note 19, § 7.24(2), at 7-8. 
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often reflecting the range of vested interests, making it rather difficult to 
do much more than compromise on the lowest common denominator.122  
An amendment of the Listing Rules may also reduce the degree of flexi-
bility afforded the SEHK, thereby depriving it of the discretion neces-
sary to maintain its preeminent position in an increasingly competitive 
world of financial markets. 
A useful benchmark that the SEHK may adopt in its interpretation 
of the revised Practice Note 18 may be to initially determine whether the 
investor is classified as “purely financial” or “strategic” by the listing 
company.  In its present form, the company would most appropriately 
define a cornerstone investor as a purely financial investor, as corner-
stone investors primarily invest with the objective of securing an allot-
ment of shares during an IPO.  Such arrangements do not provide for 
any participation in management or exchange of expertise between the 
investor and the company, and the investment is usually made during the 
road shows at which the corporate placement agreements are negotiated 
and signed. 
A strategic investor, on the other hand, is defined as a “[c]orporate 
or individual investor[] that add[s] value to investments [it or he] makes 
through industry and personal ties that can assist companies in raising 
additional capital as well as provide assistance in the marketing and 
sales process.”123  Strategic investors normally make their investments in 
the company well ahead of the planned IPO and their lock-up periods 
tend to be for a longer duration. 
All else being equal, a strategic investor has potentially more to 
offer the company than a purely financial investor, who offers only an 
investment of a specific amount of money.  Naturally, the strategic in-
vestor should also give due consideration to the duration and quality of 
the investment ahead of the IPO, as well as of the lock-up period there-
after.  In addition, the company and its advisers could present evidence 
of the potential long-term synergies that may result from closer relation-
ships between the company and its strategic investors, which could en-
hance the benefit to all of its shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the foregoing should not be the sole or primary test to 
determine whether a particular strategic investor ought to be accorded 
the status of a cornerstone investor.  Rather, the overriding test must be 
 122. See supra note 70 (disclosure and disclaimer). 
 123. See VC Experts, Strategic Investors, http://vcexperts.com/vce/library/encyclo 
pedia/glossary_view.asp?glossary_id=112 (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). 
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whether such an arrangement would be consistent with the principles of 
fairness and equality of the Listing Rules.  Conversely, the proposal to 
grant a person the preferential allocation of shares as a cornerstone in-
vestor should not by itself be seen as a breach of these principles, since 
this must include an assessment of whether the cornerstone investor has 
assumed a level of risk that is substantially above that of other investors. 
In short, the issue of cornerstone investors should not be reduced to 
a mere checklist, as these investors can contribute positively to the 
healthy development of our capital markets.  Rather, a critical assess-
ment is required of their contribution to the company over and above the 
investment of an amount of money during the IPO.  In these circum-
stances, well-publicized and objectively established guidelines should 
work better than rigid rules since, at the end of the day, it is the balanced 
and dynamic process that is more important than just a simple arrival at 
the eventual outcome. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Seven of the eight IPOs that had cornerstone investors in 2006 have 
at least one common feature, namely that they were H-Shares issued by 
companies that were incorporated in Mainland China.  The sole excep-
tion is Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings) Limited which, on closer exami-
nation, is not markedly different given the scale of its operations on the 
Mainland as well as the fact that it reports in Renminbi.124  All of these 
IPOs were very substantially oversubscribed by both institutional and 
retail investors who viewed investments in the People’s Republic of 
China favorably given its strong economic growth through 2006, high 
savings rate and the emergence of a middle class with an increasingly 
consumption-based pattern of behavior. 
The practice of introducing cornerstone investors was originally 
designed to bolster the confidence of investors in what were essentially 
semi-privatized state-owned enterprises in Mainland China whose track 
records were at best uncertain.  The marketing of such shares proved dif-
ficult during this embryonic stage, as there were many legitimate con-
cerns over transparency and the complicated share structure of the com-
panies, which included “non tradable shares”.125 
 124. See Prospectus of Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings), Ltd., available at 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060220/LTN20060220006.htm. 
 125. Approximately two-thirds of the total market capitalizations of Mainland 
Chinese companies are in the form of illiquid non-tradable shares whose legal status has 
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Much has changed since the successful listing of the first H-Share, 
Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited, on the SEHK on July 15, 1993.  
The pace of reforms has accelerated, particularly since the December 
2001 accession of Mainland China into the World Trade Organization, 
whose obligations include the opening up of its domestic financial mar-
kets.  As of January 2007, numerous micro and macro policy initiatives 
were already implemented or were being implemented, including the 
launch of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Programme126 and 
the increasing convergence of Mainland Chinese Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practices with that of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards.127 
In light of the foregoing, one must ask whether the practice of in-
viting the participation of cornerstone investors for IPOs has outlived its 
purpose.  Rather than being the investment backwaters as it was once re-
garded, Mainland China has metamorphosed into an economic power-
house with expectations that it may become the second largest economy 
in the world behind the United States.  Furthermore, despite the sup-
posed risks that are assumed by the cornerstone investors, the evidence 
suggests that these risks were more perceived than actual in 2006, as the 
IPOs were exceedingly well received.  On a closer examination of the 
returns that have been made on these investments, one must ask whether 
such arrangements are intended to benefit the company or its corner-
stone investors. 
Although cornerstone investors do not violate the Listing Rules – as 
there are no such provisions to begin with – there is nonetheless a legiti-
mate concern about the fairness of such arrangements.  It is difficult, at 
not been definitively clarified. Their origins date back to 1991 to the gradual opening up 
of stock markets under stringent socialist rules.  The presence of these shares causes 
distortions in the market based upon such concerns over issues like the protection of 
shareholder rights as well as the possible negative effect of the sale of these stocks.  
See, e.g., C. H. Kwan, Reforms of Non-tradable Shares Opening the Way for the 
Privatization of Major State-owned Enterprises, 9 NOMURA CAPITAL MKT. REV. 1, 54 
(2006), available at http://www.nicmr.com/nicmr/english/report/images/ico_reppdf.gif; 
Frederick Balfour, A Banner Year for China’s Stock Markets, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 26, 
2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/dec2006/gb200612 
26_389013.htm?chan=globalbiz_asia_investing. 
 126. See Yang Lei, ed., China relaxes QFII rules to attract more overseas 
investment, GOV.cn, Aug. 25, 2006, http://english.gov.cn/2006-08/25/content_37028 
3.htm. 
 127. See, e.g., DELOITTE, COMPARISON BETWEEN PRC GAAP & IFRS (Apr. 1, 
2005), available at http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/2005ifrsprc.pdf. 
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best, to justify their existence in increasingly dynamic markets, es-
pecially those like the SEHK in 2006, where demand for shares during 
IPOs consistently far exceeded the supply.  At worst, one could contend 
that these arrangements serve primarily to allow the underwriters to 
prefer a select group of investors, in breach of the principles of fairness 
and equality that are espoused by the Listing Rules.  Akin to the practice 
of “spinning” that prevailed in the United States at the height of the dot-
com era of the late 1990s, the practice of allocating shares to cornerstone 
investors may well be Hong Kong’s very own version of “a sophisti-
cated form of bribery”.128 
 128. See supra note 36. 
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APPENDIX I:  NEW LISTINGS ON THE MAIN BOARD OF THE STOCK 
EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG 
January 1 to December 31, 2006129 
 Stock 
Code 
Company Name  
(at time of listing) 
Listing 
Date 
(dd/mm/yy)
IPO 
Subscription 
Price (HK$) 
Total Funds 
Raised 
(HK$M) 
Total Funds 
Raised 
(US$M) 
1 2398 Good Friend Int’l 
Holdings Inc. 
11/01/06 1.130 79.1 10.141 
2 3330 Lingbao Gold Co. Ltd. 
H-Shares 
12/01/06 3.330 989.922 126.913 
3 919 Modern Beauty Salon 
Holdings Ltd. 
09/02/06 1.000 180 23.077 
4 2788 Yorkey Optical Int’l 
(Cayman) Ltd. 
10/02/06 2.200 506 64.872 
5 502 Pan Sino International 
Holding Ltd. 
01/03/06 N/A - By 
Introduction 
0.00 0.00 
6 457 O2Micro Int’l Ltd. 02/03/06 N/A - By 
Introduction 
0.00 0.00 
7 2689 Nine Dragons Paper 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
03/03/06 3.400 3,910 501.283 
8 402 Ming Hing Holdings 
Ltd. 
14/03/06 0.720 57.6 7.385 
9 3308 Golden Eagle Retail 
Group Ltd. 
21/03/06 3.150 1,630.125 208.99 
10 3323 China National Building 
Material Co. Ltd. H-
Shares 
23/03/06 2.750 2,068.919 265.246 
11 707 Co-Prosperity Holdings 
Ltd. 
30/03/06 1.160 232 29.744 
12 2626 Hunan Nonferrous 
Metals Corp. Ltd.  
H-Shares 
31/03/06 1.650 2,040.915 261.656 
 
 129. Hong Kong Exchs. & Clearing, Ltd., http://www.hkex.com.hk/index.htm (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
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 Stock 
Code 
Company Name  
(at time of listing) 
Listing 
Date 
(dd/mm/yy)
IPO 
Subscription 
Price (HK$) 
Total Funds 
Raised 
(HK$M) 
Total Funds 
Raised 
(US$M) 
13 3355 Adv. Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Corp. 
Ltd. H-Shares 
07/04/06 1.600 748.256 95.93 
14 2345 Shanghai Prime 
Machinery Co. Ltd.  
H-Shares 
27/04/06 2.100 1,450.357 185.943 
15 2880 Dalian Port (PDA) Co. 
Ltd. H-Shares 
28/04/06 2.575 2,487.45 318.904 
16 3335 DBA 
Telecommunication 
(Asia) Holdings Ltd. 
11/05/06 1.260 362.25 46.442 
17 3382 Tianjin Port 
Development Holdings 
24/05/06 1.880 1,249.636 160.21 
18 3988 Bank of China Ltd. 
H-Shares 
01/06/06 2.950 86,741.44 11,120.697 
19 474 Winbox Int’l (Holdings) 
Ltd. 
06/06/06 0.550 11 1.41 
20 527 Galaxy Semi-Conductor 
Holdings Ltd. 
09/06/06 0.860 86 11.026 
21 549 Jilin Qifeng Chemical 
Fiber Co., Ltd - H Shares
21/06/06 1.690 399.263 51.188 
22 515 TC Interconnect 
Holdings Ltd. 
23/06/06 1.000 60 7.692 
23 352 Fortune Sun (China) 
Holdings Ltd. 
05/07/06 1.060 74.497 9.551 
24 813 Shimao Property 
Holdings Ltd. 
05/07/06 6.250 4,277.453 548.391 
25 3900 Greentown China 
Holdings Limited 
13/07/06 8.220 3,069.155 393.481 
26 3989 Hembly Int’l Holdings 
Ltd. 
13/07/06 1.700 131.376 16.843 
27 3899 Enric Energy Equipment 
Holdings Ltd. 
20/07/06 N/A - By 
Introduction 
0.00 0.00 
28 3322 Win Hanverky Holdings 
Ltd. 
06/09/06 2.280 786.6 100.846 
29 3303 Jutal Offshore Oil 
Services Ltd. 
21/09/06 1.380 158.7 20.346 
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30 3968 China Merchants Bank 
Co., Ltd. H-Shares 
22/09/06 8.550 20,691 2,652.692 
31 3983 China BlueChemical 
Ltd. H-Shares 
29/09/06 1.900 3,059 392.179 
32 2700 Smart Union Group 
(Holdings) Limited 
29/09/06 1.100 79.2 10.154 
33 637 Lee Kee Holdings 
Limited 
04/10/06 2.670 614.1 78.731 
34 272 Shui On Land Ltd. 04/10/06 5.350 6,819.22 874.259 
35 667 HannStar Board Int’l 
Holdings Ltd. 
06/10/06 1.770 604.013 77.438 
36 320 Computime Group Ltd. 09/10/06 2.280 524.4 67.231 
37 337 SPG Land (Holdings) 
Ltd. 
10/10/06 4.780 1,374.25 176.186 
38 558 L.K. Technology 
Holdings Ltd. 
16/10/06 1.110 277.5 35.577 
39 3918 NagaCorp Ltd. 19/10/06 1.430 822.25 105.417 
40 1398 Industrial & Commercial 
Bank of China Ltd.  
H-Shares 
27/10/06 3.070 124,947.926 16,018.964 
41 609 Tiande Chemical 
Holdings Ltd. 
27/10/06 1.020 102 13.077 
42 1888 Kingboard Laminates 
Holdings Ltd. 
07/12/06 7.730 6,377.25 817.596 
43 477 AUPU Group Holding 
Co. Ltd. 
08/12/06 1.230 288.558 36.995 
44 552 China Communications 
Services Corp. Ltd.  
H-Shares 
08/12/06 2.200 3,266.969 418.842 
45 1818 Zhaojin Mining Industry 
Co. Ltd. H-Shares 
08/12/06 12.680 2,519.706 323.039 
46 528 Kingdom Holdings Ltd. 12/12/06 1.750 301.875 38.702 
47 1800 China Communications 
Construction Co. Ltd. 
H-Shares 
15/12/06 4.600 18,515 2,373.718 
48 1868 Neo-Neon Holdings Ltd. 15/12/06 6.900 1,587 203.462 
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49 2006 Shanghai Jin Jiang Int’l 
Hotels (Group) Co. Ltd. 
H-Shares 
15/12/06 2.200 2,783 356.795 
50 1388 Embry Holdings Ltd. 18/12/06 3.620 362 46.41 
51 1898 China Coal Energy Co. 
Ltd. H-Shares 
19/12/06 4.050 15,119.987 1,938.46 
52 3898 Zhuzhou CSR Times 
Electric Co., Ltd.  
H-Shares 
20/12/06 5.300 2,197.613 281.745 
53 1399 SCUD Group Ltd. 21/12/06 2.020 603.98 77.433 
54 1899 Xingda International 
Holdings Ltd. 
21/12/06 3.080 1,367.212 175.284 
55 1882 Haitian Int’l Holdings 
Ltd. 
22/12/06 3.950 1,576.05 202.058 
56 1389 The Ming An (Holdings) 
Co. Ltd. 
22/12/06 1.880 1,514.122 194.118 
    Total 332,083.193 42,574.768 
 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
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APPENDIX II:  BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF AND ALLOCATIONS TO 
CORNERSTONE INVESTORS DURING IPOS IN HONG KONG 
January 1 to December 31, 2006130 
Name of company Beneficial owner of 
cornerstone investor 
(as stated in prospectus) 
Amt. invested 
HK$M 
(US$M) 
Approx. % of all 
IPO shares allotted 
to cornerstone 
investor 
Nine Dragons Paper 
(Holdings) Limited 
Mr. KUOK Hock Nien 
 
Dato Dr. CHENG Yu 
Tung 
 
Dr. LEE Shau Kee 
 
156 ($20) 
 
156 ($20) 
 
 
156 ($20) 
4.58 
 
4.58 
 
 
4.58 
Bank of China 
Limited 
H-Shares 
China Life Insurance 
(Group) Co. Ltd.@ 
 
China Life Insurance 
Co. Ltd.@ 
 
The Bank of East Asia, 
Ltd. 
 
The Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd 
 
Cheung Kong 
(Holdings) Limited* 
 
Hutchsion Whampoa 
Limited* 
 
Dato Dr. CHENG Yu 
Tung 
 
Dr. LEE Shau Kee 
 
Mr. KUOK Hock Nien 
 
Mr. CHEN Din Hwa^ 
 
Ms. CHEN Wai Wai 
Vivien^ 
 
Ping An Insurance 
(Group) of China, Ltd. 
 
Sun Hung Kai 
Properties Ltd. 
1,162.92 ($149) 
 
 
1,162.92 ($149) 
 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
 
697.752 ($89.5) 
 
 
697.752 ($89.5) 
 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
1,255.954 ($161) 
 
139.550 ($17.9) 
 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
1.54 
 
 
1.54 
 
 
1.85 
 
 
1.85 
 
 
0.92 
 
 
0.92 
 
 
1.85 
 
 
1.85 
 
1.85 
 
1.66 
 
0.18 
 
 
1.85 
 
 
1.85 
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Sino Land Co. Ltd. 
 
Mr. Peter WOO Kwong 
Ching 
 
 
1,240.448 ($159) 
 
1,395.504 ($178.9) 
 
 
1.64 
 
1.85 
China BlueChemical 
Ltd. 
H-Shares 
Dr. LEE Shau Kee 
 
Chinese Estates 
Holdings Ltd. 
 
Bank of China Limited 
 
China Cinda Asset 
Management Corp. 
 
195 ($25) 
 
195 ($25) 
 
 
156 ($20) 
 
100 ($12.8) 
7.33 
 
7.33 
 
 
5.86 
 
3.75 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China Limited 
H-Shares 
China Life Insurance 
(Group) Co. Ltd.@ 
 
China Life Insurance 
Company Limited@ 
 
Cheung Kong 
(Holdings) Limited* 
 
Hutchsion Whampoa 
Limited* 
 
Dato Dr CHENG Yu 
Tung 
 
CITIC Pacific Limited 
 
Mr. YUNG Chi Kin 
 
Dr LEE Shau Kee 
 
Government of 
Singapore Investment 
Corp. 
 
Mr. KUOK Hock Nien 
 
Kuwait Investment 
Authority 
 
Mr. CHEN Din Hwa^ 
 
Ms. CHEN Wai Wai 
Vivien^ 
 
Qatar Investment 
Authority 
 
Sun Hung Kai 
Properties Limited 
 
United Overseas Bank 
Limited 
 
Mr. Peter WOO Kwong 
Ching 
4,400 ($564.1) 
 
 
2,000 ($256.4) 
 
 
800 ($102.6) 
 
 
800 ($102.6) 
 
 
1,600 ($205.1) 
 
 
800 ($102.6) 
 
800 ($102.6) 
 
1,600 ($205.1) 
 
2,800 ($359) 
 
 
 
1,600 ($205.1) 
 
5,600 ($717.9) 
 
 
1,440 ($184.6) 
 
160 ($20.5) 
 
 
1,600 ($205.1) 
 
 
1,600 ($205.1) 
 
 
1,600 ($205.1) 
 
 
1,600 ($205.1) 
4.04 
 
 
1.84 
 
 
0.73 
 
 
0.73 
 
 
1.47 
 
 
0.73 
 
0.73 
 
1.47 
 
2.57 
 
 
 
1.47 
 
5.15 
 
 
1.32 
 
0.14 
 
 
1.47 
 
 
1.47 
 
 
1.47 
 
 
1.47 
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Zhaojin Mining 
Industry Co. Ltd. 
H-Shares 
Standard Bank Plc 
 
Mr, HO Tsu Kwok, 
Charles 
 
Dr. LO Ka Shui 
 
Global Investment 
House 
 
93 ($11.9) 
 
93 ($11.9) 
 
 
77.5 ($9.9) 
 
77.5 ($9.9) 
4.24 
 
4.24 
 
 
3.53 
 
3.53 
China 
Communications 
Construction Co. 
Ltd. H-Shares 
China Life Insurance 
(Group) Co. Ltd.@ 
 
Dato Dr. CHENG Yu 
Tung 
 
Government of 
Singapore Investment 
Corp. 
 
650 ($83.3) 
 
 
650 ($83.3) 
 
 
650 ($83.3) 
4.03 
 
 
4.03 
 
 
4.03 
Shanghai Jin Jiang 
International Hotels 
(Group) Co. Ltd. 
H-Shares 
Bank of China Limited 
 
Dr. The Hon. Sir David 
LI Kwok Po 
156 ($20) 
 
156 ($20) 
6.44 
 
6.44 
China Coal Energy 
Company Limited  
H-Shares 
Cheung Kong 
(Holdings) Limited 
 
China Life Insurance 
(Group) Co. Ltd.@ 
 
Dato Dr. CHENG Yu 
Tung 
 
CITIC Pacific Limited 
 
Mr. YUNG Chi Kin 
 
Dr. LEE Shau Kee 
390 ($50) 
 
 
390 ($50) 
 
 
 
390 ($50) 
 
 
195 ($25) 
 
195 ($25) 
 
390 ($50) 
2.96 
 
 
2.96 
 
 
 
2.96 
 
 
1.48 
 
1.48 
 
2.96 
Notes: 
The IPO Shares do not include any green shoe over allotment options that are exercised. 
All commitments in US$ are converted to its Hong Kong counterpart at the rate of US$1 to 
HK$7.80. 
The percentages are rounded down to the nearest second decimal point. 
* Hutchison Whampoa Limited is a subsidiary of Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited. 
Both companies are listed on the SEHK. 
@ China Life Insurance Company Limited is listed on the SEHK and is a subsidiary of 
China Life Insurance (Group) Company Limited, the latter of which is a state-owned finan-
cial and insurance enterprise. 
^       Mr. CHEN Din Hwa and Ms. CHEN Wai Wai Vivien are related and together control 
the unlisted Nan Fung Group Limited whose corporate interests span cotton spinning, ship-
ping, construction, real estate management, and share and securities investments. 
 
